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1. Introduction
During the 1930’s, there was a prevailing view that governments ought to control their rapidly
expanding transport industries through special legislation (Button 1989). The argument was
that it was necessary to control natural monopolies, to prevent wasteful or destructive
competition, to enable transport industries to develop in an efficient and orderly way, and to
ensure safe operations. It was during this period that the commercial potential of civil aviation
was beginning to be demonstrated and it is not surprising that governments of all persuasions
assumed close control over the provision of airline services.
There were always critics of the regulatory response, but it was not until the 1970’s that the
majority of academics and other analysts were of the opinion that specific regulation of airlines
was no longer necessary or desirable (Levine 1987). The legitimacy of market failure
arguments was under strong empirical and theoretical attack and there was evidence that fares
and costs would be lower if more liberal market arrangements were permitted. Furthermore,
maintenance of restrictive regulations was seen to favour airlines or suppliers of inputs to the
airline industry while the administration required to implement regulation was regarded as a
deadweight loss at best, and more likely it fostered inefficiency because it established
inappropriate incentives for managers. In short, regulation of the airlines was judged to be
inimical to the interests of the public it was supposed to be protecting.
These arguments were persuasive enough for the Government of the USA to introduce its
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 and, in the process, triggered a chain of reforms of civil
aviation throughout the world. For example, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Australia and
Canada moved down the liberalisation path during the next decade and a half. Given a host of
country-specific factors and the relative sizes of the domestic airline markets, there have been
differences in the approaches adopted. The common factors have been a move to regulations
designed to govern the behaviour of all industries, free entry and exit of airlines to the industry
and no controls on individual routes, freedom to set fares, removal of most forms of direct
subsidy and privatisation of national airlines.
During the 1990’s, the pace of reform has accelerated and now liberalisation of airline markets
is occurring or it is under active consideration in a large number of less developed countries
ranging in size from Mongolia and Papua New Guinea with populations of only a few million
to the largest nations, China and India. However, the motivation for change and the
institutional and economic environments in these cases differ substantially from the developed
country examples cited above. The first steps in the liberalisation process tend be reactive; the
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main intention being to overcome resource constraints by allowing private sector airlines to
expand available capacity to cope with rapid growth in demand (Bailey 1993). At least in the
initial stage, it is usual to signal that the government intends to control entry, capacity and
fares, but the particular mechanisms required to achieve this are non-existent or are
unworkable. An uneasy period follows as it begins to be appreciated that partial controls can
produce undesirable outcomes and as policy and regulatory mechanisms continue to evolve.
The following sections elaborate on these themes, but a central proposition is that, though
there have been few attempts to interpret an extensive literature on the subject of airline
competition in the context of less developed countries, there are lessons to be learned. This is
particularly important given the limited opportunities to investigate and evaluate alternative
aviation policies in the less developed country context prior to change. A key lesson is that
privatisation of the national airline can yield benefits, but these can be placed in jeopardy if the
airline is not prepared properly. The paper argues that a high priority in the less developed
country should be to strengthen the management and capability of its airline and aviation
administration and to ensure that necessary infrastructure is in place to support a competitive
industry. Another important lesson is that it is a very difficult task for a government to try to
maintain control over fares when the market has some thin routes, especially when they are
cross-subsidised from more profitable traffic. There can be benefits in abandoning direct
controls over fares, but this raises questions about how airline services can be maintained on
routes deemed vital by the government.
The paper illustrates the predicament for policy makers in the developing country context by
examining the situation in Nepal, a country with a relatively small domestic airline system.
Until recently, the government's airline, Royal Nepal Airlines Corporation (RNAC), was the
sole provider of scheduled airline services within this rugged and resource-poor country. The
reasons why the Government has adopted a more liberal, pro-competitive aviation policy are
examined, but the conclusion is drawn that the current policy addresses only the most
immediate problems. This position is not sustainable and the Government will have to take up
the challenge to continue along the path of reform. It is argued that developments in Nepal are
resulting from pressures being experienced in other less developed countries so that the lessons
that can be learned in Nepal have more general implications.
2. Liberalising airline competition in less developed countries–the initial steps
The benefits of liberalising airline competition appear to be substantial but there are risks in the
developing country context. Decisions need to be made about the role of the government
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airline in a more competitive environment, the desirability of maintaining subsidies to particular
groups, the means for providing those subsidies, what aspects of airline competition to
liberalise, and what regulatory mechanisms to maintain. Domestic aviation infrastructure and
services remain at an early stage of development and civil aviation policy has been framed with
a presumption of natural monopoly or ineffective competition, a weak private sector and a
general lack of resources. The airlines provide vital services to many communities and act as a
catalyst to development in a context where surface transport services are, at best, rudimentary.
It is possible that start-up airlines will fail and, in the process, threaten the viability of the
industry. Yet these countries cannot afford to maintain inefficient airlines, and many have
experienced declining service standards because they have been unable to devote needed
resources into the aviation sector.
In some of the less developed countries, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank
have convinced governments to liberalise their economies and to allow greater private sector
involvement in areas previously reserved for government corporations. However, even in the
case of India where these international agencies have been involved in an economic “rescue
package”, the move to liberalise airline competition resulted from pressures of growth in traffic
and the inability of the government’s airline to cater for the needs of a developing tourism
sector (Louden 1993). Across the Asian region, airline demand is growing at a rapid pace and
new airlines are emerging and surviving at a faster rate than anywhere else in the world, but
paradoxically this is occurring within economies where governments tend to have very
restrictive regulatory regimes (Lee 1992; Bailey 1993). The government airline in the less
developed countries tends to be treated as a national asset that plays a key role in promoting
economic and social development, especially since many of these countries have poor surface
transport systems. Also, in at least some of these nations, the government airline is perceived
to be amongst the best performing public sector enterprises. In brief, the key government
objective of liberalising entry to the airline industry is to assist in the growth of the market and
the change in policy is not borne chiefly out of a desire to reform the airline industry.
The starting point for liberalisation tends to be a relaxation of controls over entry and capacity
but then events quickly overcome the regulators as the new entrants vie for competitive
advantage against a neglected national carrier. This is certainly the experience in India where
the Director General of Civil Aviation has been overwhelmed by a rapidly growing industry
and has found it necessary to issue a stream of policy edicts in an attempt to regain control
(Mhatre 1994). Given the volatility in airline competition in developed countries when
regulations have been relaxed, this situation is not surprising. Profits can depend critically on
small shifts in market shares, so incumbents and new entrants alike can be expected to push
economic regulations to the limits. Once the initial steps have been taken down the
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liberalisation path, it becomes difficult to sustain regulations over fares and over exit from
unprofitable services.
An important lesson in the developed countries was that the process and pace of liberalisation
can be important in determining the outcome. When the USA liberalised its airline market, the
changes were phased in. With the benefit of hindsight, the Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics
Board who presided over deregulation, Alfred Kahn, has said that it would have been better to
have introduced the reforms more quickly (Kahn 1990). His reasons were that the incumbent
airlines are able to use the phasing-in period to entrench competitive advantage, negating some
of the benefits of liberalisation. In Australia, the incumbents were given several years to
prepare themselves and this allowed them to reduce costs, to improve services, and to bolster
their positions prior to the entry of a new airline, Compass. The subsequent failure of that
airline can, in part, be attributed to the actions of the incumbents in the period leading up to the
entry of Compass (Nyathi et al 1993).
The dilemma for the government in a less developed country is that liberalisation of entry into
the airline industry addresses the immediate problem of capacity shortages, but it sets in motion
forces that require further regulatory reform. The challenge is to make the necessary
adjustments as quickly as possible in the absence of reliable data. Fortunately, the experiences
elsewhere with airline competition do provide guidance on such matters as the institutional
framework within which airlines will be competing, the access of airlines to infrastructure and
resources, the role of privatisation, the economics of thin routes, the setting of fares, and
provision of subsidies.
3. The institutional environment–is it enough to deregulate the airline industry?
The Airline Deregulation Act in the USA was a landmark event in the global move to
liberalisation of airline competition, but it would be misleading to interpret this as a move to
abandon all economic controls over the industry. There was a strong tradition in the USA of
competition policy and consumer protection; deregulation simply meant that actual and
potential competition amongst airlines would be used as the key regulatory instruments with
the Government maintaining residual controls over mergers and anti-competitive practices.
Also, the USA ensured that small communities would continue to enjoy airline service, at least
in the initial period, through a system of subsidies.
Just as important, private sector airlines in the developed countries have operated within a
financial environment with its own strong institutions. Start-up airlines have been able to issue
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shares on stock exchanges and to appeal to the financial sector for loans while financial
analysts and the press have monitored the performances of individual airlines. That is, there is a
system of effective governance of managers and of corporate behaviour. This is important
because governments proceeding down the path of liberalisation in less robust markets face
political risks as start-up and incumbent airlines fail. The USA could take it in its stride that
icons such as Pan Am, TWA and the newer People Express could not sustain themselves. In
Australia the Government has not escaped criticism over the failure of start-up airlines even
though the main causes of their demise can be found in faulty corporate strategy (Nyathi et al
1993). In India, another country moving to liberalise competition in the airline industry, already
there have been numerous financial failures of start-up airlines and the Government is under
pressure to protect its own domestic carrier, Indian Airlines, even before the Government
passes legislation to allow free competition (Mama 1993; Mhatre 1994).
 The capability of the private sector to operate complex airline organisations has been taken for
granted in the developing countries, but the challenges for less developed countries are greater.
In China, for example, it has been noted that an obstacle to listing some new airlines on  the
Hong Kong stock exchange is the amount of time it requires to develop the necessary expertise
to introduce and sustain management systems (Air Tran port World , March 94, page 20).
These problems are exacerbated when the market is growing as strongly as it is in the Asian
region.
A key concern is whether the lack of management expertise, the problems in obtaining
adequate capital and lack of profits lead to safety problems. The proposition that safety should
continue to be regulated is one that is unchallenged and it tends to be assumed that strict
controls over the granting of airworthiness certificates and a system of surveillance of
standards allows government to treat safety and economic regulations as though they are
distinct. Statistical analyses of accident and incident statistics in the USA provide support for
the argument that liberalisation of airline markets does not compromise safety performance and
it seems that this is borne out by reductions in insurance premiums (Button 1989). However,
Pan American, Eastern and American all breached safety regulations, one for falsification of
company records (Ruppenthal 1987). If businesses of this standing have problems then it
cannot be taken for granted that airlines will place safety above all else. Unfortunately, there is
little research that directly examines corporate approaches to safety in adverse economic
circumstances. Ruppenthal claims that cost cutting in the deregulated trucking industry is
common and that it does lead to “dangerous compromises” and that the same type of
systematic corporate behaviour can be expected in under-capitalised airlines facing financial
difficulties.
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Although it can be argued that profit-seeking firms might be just as willing to compromise
standards as ailing firms, the issue is a serious one and it underscores the importance of having
strong institutions to regulate safety. A recent inquiry into safety problems in Australia has
shown that, even with strong regulations, there can be problems in implementation of standards
when the individuals who are responsible for policing breaches of regulations lack the
necessary skills and experience (Mason 1994). In pointing out that most aviation safety
problems can be attributed to human error, Button (1989) approaches the heart of the problem
in the less developed countries. Although he might be correct in concluding that this makes it
difficult to improve the safety performance of airlines in the developed countries, the lack of
skills and experience in less developed countries is more of a problem. India and China both
have experienced rapid growth in their domestic airline industries and the spate of fatal crashes,
hijacks and incidents has been linked directly to a lack of management and institutional strength
(Louden 1993; Air Transport World , March 94, page 14). In the past, airlines in less
developed countries, particularly in Africa, tended to wet lease aircraft, and this ensured access
to experienced commercial aircraft pilots. But, with foreign exchange problems in the mid-
1980’s and early 1990’s, the African countries resorted to dry leases. Pilots trained for combat
purposes were recruited and trained to fly civil aircraft in relatively short time. As the less
developed countries cope with increasing competition among airlines, an important
consideration is the managerial and financial health of those organisations and their ability to
maintain standards of safety. Sound monitoring by institutions with the appropriate expertise is
necessary, highlighting the need for building managerial, technical and institutional strength
during the liberalisation process.
4. Should privatisation be a high priority?
In many of the less developed countries, privatisation tends to be pushed to the top of the
agenda shortly after the process of liberalisation commences. One possibility is that
governments of the less developed countries are seeking to improve their financial position
through the sale of public assets. Another is that the managers of the public sector
organisations see privatisation as their salvation, freeing them from interference by
government, injecting new capital and possibly bringing in needed management and technical
expertise through an alliance with an established foreign carrier. For governments of less
developed countries faced with demands to inject large amounts of capital into their airlines,
privatisation is seen as a natural extension of liberalising entry by private sector airlines.
Whatever the case, it is important that governments understand what it is they hope to achieve
with privatisation.
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One of the key lessons to be learned from the developed countries is that it is necessary to
prepare an airline for privatisation, a process that can take many years. The business needs to
be valued and it has to be capitalised properly, its management and staff prepared to operate on
a fully commercial basis and the government needs to evaluate the many paths that can be
taken in privatisation. A first stage in the developed countries often is to corporatise the
national airline and, once able to operate on a commercial basis, it can be exposed to
competition.
There is some evidence that these two initiatives, corporatisation and exposure to competition,
generate most of the efficiency gains and that privatisation provides marginal gains beyond that
point (Hensher & Beesley 1992). However, it is a difficult position to sustain to invite private
sector competition and then for the government to retain ownership of an airline. In Australia,
for example, the Government was extremely reluctant to entertain the possibility of selling its
airline when it made the initial decisions to deregulate its airline industry, but within a short
time it succumbed to the inevitability of privatisation (Nyathi et al 1993). Liberalisation of
airline competition in developed countries has been accompanied by privatisation and it is
difficult to see that this pattern will not be followed in the less developed countries.
An important observation is that privatisation does not necessarily mean more or less
competition, or more or less regulation. The regulatory and competitive environments are
separate issues from the question of ownership of the enterprise. Regulation can change in a
variety of ways, or not at all, at the time of privatisation (Ashworth & Forsyth 1985). If
privatisation is embarked upon without exposing the airline to competition, a government
monopoly can be replaced by a private sector monopoly, and there is no reason to believe that
this will generate net benefits.
5. Infrastructure and other resource constraints
In the developed countries, new airlines have been able to acquire virtually all of the inputs
they required. Despite some difficulty in raising sufficient capital, the start-up ventures have
been able to obtain new or used aircraft, they have been able to recruit and train crews,
maintenance facilities have been available, and management teams have been assembled. In
India and China, with their potentially large airline markets, the new airlines are demonstrating
again that these challenges can be overcome, especially through alliances with established
airlines and leasing companies in other countries. However, it has been reported that 115 of
Indian Airlines’ 450 pilots resigned in the 15 months to June 1993. The Indian Government has
had to issue assurances that the private sector airlines will not be able to continue poaching
Hooper, Hutcheson & Nyathi The Case of Nepal
Institute of Transport Studies 8
engineers and pilots, and it has instructed Indian Airlines to cease contracting out its surplus
engineering capacity to the private sector airlines (Louden 1993). Attention must be paid to
improving the situation of the government’s airline or it should be expected that the start-up
airlines will draw resources away from it.
One other matter that needs to be considered is the advantage that large, incumbent carriers
have enjoyed in the developed countries with their distribution systems, particularly through
their computer reservation systems (Button 1989). In the less developed country context, it is
not clear that computer reservation systems will play such an important role, at least for the
domestic market. Nevertheless, the incumbent airlines are likely to command a high degree of
loyalty from local travel agents and new entrants can be forced to offer higher commissions to
attract business (Nyathi et al 1993). Even more important, government carriers tend to be both
a domestic and an international carrier and this gives them advantages in attracting foreign
traffic.
Another problematic area in the developed countries has been that access to airport
infrastructure has been a constraint during the liberalisation process. In the USA, a dispute
with air traffic controllers resulted in the rationing of landing slots during early stages of
deregulation (Button 1989). In Australia, the incumbent airlines gained control over passenger
terminals so that the new entrant was at a disadvantage (Nyathi et al 1993). More recently, it
seems that the same issue is arising in India where the Government has been accused of
deliberately being tardy in its allocation of terminal space to new carriers (Louden 1993).
Governments find themselves in the difficult position of wanting to create a “level playing
field” while respecting the rights of the incumbent airlines to enjoy the fruits of many years of
development of their facilities. The lesson that has been learned in the developed countries is
that these infrastructure constraints can limit the gains to be derived from liberalisation (Barrett
1992).
6. Fares, subsidies and public service obligations
A common feature of less developed countries is that they have patchy networks including
some routes with very light traffic density. This gives rise to a number of problems in providing
services and in setting fares. If a single airline serves the network, it can consolidate traffic to
take advantage of the economies of larger aircraft, perhaps by reducing frequency (when the
number of flights already is low), or by operating stopping flights. In the process of achieving
operational cost savings, passengers are inconvenienced and, if competition is permitted,
opportunities are created for rivals to enter the market. The incumbent airline has to
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compromise operational efficiency in order to offer a service level with a fare structure that
will discourage competition. This raises a question whether the gains the less developed
country can reap from liberalisation are less than would be achieved if the regulator insisted on
rationalising services within a monopoly context.
This is a question that deserves serious consideration, but the experience in the developed
countries with airline competition is that the problems of route structure and pricing are more
sensitive than they are for denser routes (Forsyth 1991; Morrison & Winston 1989; Nyathi
1992). It is a very difficult task to determine a priori what route structure is efficient in a
market with a mix of dense and thin markets. A detailed knowledge about demand and about
costs on individual routes is required and experience has shown that a commercially-oriented
airline is in a better position than the government to decide on the level of service and on price
structures.
In the developing country case, liberalisation of entry tends to precede relaxation of controls
on fares. This might appear to be justified if at least some of the low density routes will be
served by a single airline, but the practical difficulties in controlling fares should not be under-
estimated. Typically, airline fares are set by regulators according to a formula, perhaps with a
flag-fall component and a factor related to distance. In the developed countries, liberalisation
permitted the airlines to set their own fares and the result has been lower fares for consumers,
especially through the discounting activities of the airlines in their attempts to stimulate growth
in price-sensitive market segments. The airlines have become more marketing-oriented and
they have moved away from mileage based air fares and have focused on maximising the
revenue from each flight through their yield management systems (Button 1989). Once there is
competition among the airlines, it is inevitable that they will want to vary their prices,
especially if the problems of competing with a mix of direct and indirect flights exist. Failure by
the government to relax controls over fares is likely to be an untenable position that results in
short-term inefficiencies (Ritchie & Rowcroft 1992).
However, there is an additional reason why the governments of the less developed countries
are not willing to relinquish their control over fares. Airline fares tend to be kept low in
general, especially for remote communities that do not have good surface transport links.
Domestic air transport for residents is cross-subsidised by foreigners travelling on domestic
routes at substantially higher fares and by international services provided by the national airline.
Once entry is liberalised, this arrangement becomes difficult to sustain. If the new entrants are
required to charge the same fares as the government airline without the same ability to earn
surpluses in international markets, they are likely to minimise their exposure to the carriage of
the most unprofitable traffic. In the case of Korea, this has led to pressures to allow the new
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entrant to compete on international routes (Lee 1992). In China the Government caters for the
ambitions of the new airlines by requiring that they carry one million passengers a year on
domestic routes before they can apply for rights to operate on international routes (Air
Transport World February 1994, page 18). In India, the Government has decreed that the
private sector airlines must spread their services equally over short and long routes (Mhatre
1994).
Clearly the requirement to adhere to a set of regulated fares that allows some groups to travel
at less than costs, and the unequal access to profitable traffic poses a serious policy dilemma
for the governments of less developed countries. Further, the issue of subsidy is one that must
be addressed if the government airline is to be privatised.  Alternatives to cross-subsidisation
need to be considered, including direct payments, protected route packages, and competitive
tendering (Ritchie & Rowcroft 1992). If direct subsidies are provided, they can be
administered through a system of payments for meeting community service obligations, with
contracts specified in such a way to set commercial objectives for the airlines and with
incentives for the airline to reduce costs. Another, though less common solution, is to franchise
a set of routes to one airline having set the minimum service standards for the remote
communities (Mason 1994). This requires monitoring by the government, but the franchisee is
encouraged to develop the market via the threat of losing the right to operate. Without actual
competition, however, it is difficult to gauge the welfare benefits that arise from these
approaches.
7. The Nepal case:
a profile of the airline industry prior to liberalisation of entry
The challenge for the less developed country liberalising competition in its airline industry vary
depending upon the circumstances, but the preceding discussion indicates that there are some
common and important themes. In the remainder of the paper, the nature of these challenges
will by illustrated in more detail using the particular example of Nepal, a sovereign,
independent Kingdom bordered on the north by the Tibet Autonomous Region of the People's
Republic of China, on the east by Sikkim and on the south and west by India. Though it is a
small country, its topography makes it difficult to develop an efficient road transport system
linking its cities and towns, and access for smaller settlements remains poor. In recognition of
this, the government maintains a policy of subsidising air travel by its residents and it finances
this through the high fares paid by tourists; Nepalese and Indian nationals pay anywhere
between 10 and 30 percent of the amounts charged to foreigners.
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Until recently, Royal Nepal Airlines Corporation (RNAC) was the sole domestic airline, and it
has been operating on most of its routes with average annual seat factors in excess of 80
percent. On the important tourist routes the seat factor often reaches 100 percent in the peak
periods. The airline operates scheduled services to 38 points inside Nepal, in the main with a
fleet of 19-seat, turboprop aircraft. On some of the denser routes, the airline is able to employ
its 44-seat aircraft. Also, RNAC operates scenic “mountain flights” that depart from and return
to Kathmandu, the national capital, but they are provided mainly with Boeing 727's otherwise
used on international flights. RNAC’s domestic fleet is well suited to operations in Nepal, but
weather conditions and other constraints combine to delay flights or, in some circumstances, to
cause cancellations.
The overwhelming majority of non-Indian visitors to Nepal arrive and depart by air, but fewer
than 30 percent uses RNAC's domestic services. In 1991/92, the total number of passengers
travelling on domestic services was 309,400, approximately one-quarter of whom were
foreigners. Table 1 shows that the foreigner traffic is concentrated on a small number of the
more dense routes in the network. Just three routes, including the sightseeing, mountain
flights, attract 70 percent of tourist traffic and another five routes account for an additional
22% of the foreigner traffic. Also, Table 1 illustrates the degree of concentration of traffic
generally. Eight routes have almost half of the total traffic and three-quarters of RNAC's routes
generate fewer than 3,000 passengers each year and contribute only one-third of total traffic.
These same low density routes tend not to attract significant demand from the higher yield,
foreign traffic.
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Table 1: Distribution of domestic airline passenger traffic
Annual Traffic
(passengers
   in each direction)
Number
of Routes
Share of
Total Traffic
Share of
Foreign
on route
Share of all
Foreign
Traffic
% % %
More than 25,000 1 16 60 37
15,000 to 25,000 1 10 12 5
10,000 to 15,000 1 6 63 15
5,000 to 10,000 4 17 24 17
3,000 to 5,000 7 14 2 1
2,000 to 3,000 13 18 5 3
1,000 to 5,000 10 10 12 5
Less than 1,000 14 4 1 0
Mountain Flight 1 5 100 18
Total 52 100 26 100
Source: Adapted from RNAC Operating Plan 1992/93.
Previous studies have indicated that the revenue earned by RNAC on its domestic services
covers approximately 80 percent of its costs and that only a minority of routes is profitable.
The fares charged to Nepalese residents are low by any standards and it has been claimed in
one recent report that revenue on some routes barely covers fuel costs (TecnEcon et al 1989).
The differential in fares between Nepalese residents and foreigners guarantees that there is a
large cross-subsidy from one group to the other. A statistical relationship exists between fares
charged to foreigners and block times, and this exhibits a flag-fall and a variable amount, but
the structure of the fares levied on residents is influenced by other factors (Morrison 1992).
The subsidies appear to be higher on the longer routes out of Kathmandu into western hill
regions, but the pattern is highly variable and is not based simply on factors such as the lack of
all-weather road access.
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8. Liberalisation–a new era in Nepal
In common with many countries, Nepal has been concerned about the efficiency of its
government business enterprises. Also, the private sector has been relatively and it has focused
its energies on trade and real estate. In recent years, the Government has signalled its desire to
increase the scope for private sector participation in a wider range of activities and, in its
Eighth Plan for the period 1992 to 1997, the Government affirmed that the restrictive
economic policies of the previous thirty years were to be abandoned and that the aim was to ...
transform the economy into an open, liberal, transparent and competitive market oriented
economy (National Planning Commission 1992).
As a result, licencing has been abolished in many areas of industry and steps have been taken to
privatise a small number of non-performing manufacturing companies considered to be
commercially viable, but there is an expressed intention to proceed with further liberalisation
and privatisation. Since RNAC has been the only government business enterprise to maintain
profitability since its formation, it is not foremost among the concerns of the Government in its
privatisation programme. At the same time, development of the tourism sector has become a
priority as the government has recognised that tourism has become one of the few prospects
available to increase the nation's foreign exchange income (Touche Ross 1990). In His
Majesty's Government of Nepal's Eighth Plan, a target of 475,000 foreign visitors was set for
1995, rising to 953,000 in 2010; the development of civil aviation is regarded as a key element
in this plan, especially in promoting western areas of the country.
A succession of reports on transport, tourism and aviation has drawn attention to RNAC's
inadequacies, especially its reservations systems, its facilities for passengers, its maintenance
operations, and its lack of reliability (Touche Ross 1990; Intercontinental Consultants and
Technocrats 1993). RNAC is working to improve its efficiency by developing regional hubs for
services into the hill regions in the east and west, respectively. This will allow some
rationalisation of services, particularly the cessation of some of the longer flights from
Kathmandu that are not suited to operations using small turboprop aircraft. Other benefits
likely to arise from the proposed rationalisation of services are more efficient cargo operations
into the hills of western Nepal and less exposure to fog delays at Kathmandu.
By 1991, the Government found itself under considerable pressure to approve charter airline
operations service to cater for what was perceived to be a large unmet demand and, as a result,
introduced a more liberal, pro-competitive policy to the domestic aviation sector. Before
examining the implications of these changes, it worth drawing attention to the lack of
infrastructure and services at airports and its consequences for operations, safety and comfort
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of passengers. Many of the smaller airports can be described as "common user" facilities, but
the key terminal in Kathmandu is controlled by RNAC. Already heavily congested, there has
been a lack of capacity for the new entrant airlines and conditions at this critical airport are
poor by any standard. Facilities for passengers at all regional terminals are sub-standard for the
needs of tourists, but this is especially the case at the important tourist airports. More
seriously, all regional airports have damaged runways in need of urgent repairs, fire fighting
and rescue capabilities are totally inadequate, most have barely sufficient security and air traffic
control procedures. In short, operational standards are sub-standard and safety levels are
unacceptable.
The Department of Civil Aviation (DCA), the authority responsible for the airports, in
common with RNAC, has suffered from a general inertia and inability to fulfil corporate and
organisational objectives and to respond to market conditions. Communications within and
between organisations have been ineffective and neither RNAC nor DCA has the confidence of
the private sector. Fundamental problems have been that both organisations have not been
structured to provide optimal levels of service to their respective "customers" or to the tourism
industry, and the DCA has lacked an effective means of recovering costs from users. Over a
long period of time, the cumulative effect of a lack of investment in infrastructure, neglect of
maintenance and training and development of staff is that the domestic aviation industry has
not been positioned to provide the support required to expand high value-added tourism.
Equally as important, it is unlikely that the safe carriage of Nepalese nationals can be
guaranteed. Under-equipped, under-staffed and stifled by an inactive bureaucracy, the air
transport system in Nepal is not able to support and stimulate economic growth, either from
trade or tourism.
As part of the reforms introduced with the Eighth Plan, the private sector was invited in May
1992 to commence operating commercial airline services on domestic routes. Two carriers,
Everest Air and Nepal Airways were licenced and commenced immediately and they were
joined in September of the same year by Necon Air. A fourth operator, Himalayan Helicopters
has entered the market with a single Bell helicopter.
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Table 2: New entrant aircraft fleets
Airline Aircraft
Type
Number of
Aircraft
Seats
per Aircraft
Nepal Airways Yak 12 3 17
Everest Air Dornier 3 15/19
Necon Air Avro HS 748 2 44
Himalayan Helicopters Bell Helicopter 1 5
The three airlines operating scheduled services are based in Kathmandu and have entered
routes with the greatest concentration of traffic connecting Kathmandu with the primary tourist
centres. Though it has left the new entrants free to enter and leave routes and to add capacity,
the Government's action falls far short of "deregulation". The Directorate of Civil Aviation
retains regulatory powers over all airlines, including RNAC, and further restrictions on the
private sector airlines are that:
• aircraft must be owned and operated by Nepalese nationals
• carriers must allocate at least 40 percent of their flight hours on non-tourist routes to 
fulfil "community service obligations"
• fares must be the same as those charged by RNAC except on those new routes not 
previously served by RNAC
• on new routes, the private sector airlines must submit their fares to the Directorate of 
Civil Aviation for approval
The additional capacity provided by the private sector airlines does not appear at the initial
stage to have resulted in a significant fall in load factors. Everest Air has claimed, for example,
that it is achieving a load factor of more than 80 percent on the main tourist routes. It has been
estimated that, if this level of performance can be sustained without reducing the loads carried
by RNAC, overall traffic levels will have increased by up to 65 percent (Intercontinental
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Consultants and Technocrats 1993). It appears that the Government's objective of increasing
capacity is being achieved.
Other early signs that the more liberal competition policy is producing beneficial results are
that, with the exception of Necon Air, the private sector airlines have introduced new
equipment, and the airline traveller has gained by having a wider range of choice in terms of
frequency and aircraft type. In addition, the new entrants are experimenting with different
service arrangements including direct services to a major trekking centre, and mountain flights
from Pokhara, a city being promoted by the Government as a secondary centre for tourism.
The lack of basic maintenance on the runway at Lukla, the airport serving the Mount Everest
area, has prevented Everest Air from entering this popular and lucrative route. Though the
private sector airlines have been encouraged by the Government to invest in passenger facilities
at airport terminals, there has been little attention to this matter.
The private sector airlines are active in promoting their services, especially through the print
media, and though they are developing their sales and marketing capabilities, they all rely
heavily on local travel agents. RNAC enjoys a considerable advantage in dealing with the travel
industry, if only because of the relationships it has built up over a long period of time and
because of its international operations. It is not surprising to find that the new airlines have
been paying commissions as high as nine percent, and special promotions such as prizes are
being used to boost demand on some routes.
On one route where Everest Air has introduced direct flights where before there were none it
has been given approval by the Directorate of Civil Aviation to charge Nepalese residents a
fare that is almost at the same level as applies to foreigners. By November of 1992, there were
signs that the new airlines wanted to raise the general level of fares for residents. By the close
of 1993, the fares remained unchanged while the new airlines appeared to be thriving.
Nevertheless, it will not be surprising, in view of the wide differential, if there are pressures to
increase the fares for residents on some routes. If the average yield is set too low, the private
sector airlines will have little choice but to prune their costs, and there is an obvious danger
that this could jeopardise reliability or, even more serious, safe operations.
So far, RNAC has not mounted a major competitive response, focusing its energies on the
development of a hub airport outside Kathmandu to service western areas of the nation and
improving its communications system for reservations on some of the key routes. Indeed, it has
cooperated with the new entrants by setting aside a small amount of space in its crowded
terminal at Kathmandu. RNAC is not likely  to remain passive if its traffic and yields fall, but it
will be somewhat constrained. Also, RNAC has indicated in the past that it would like to re-
equip with new aircraft and to expand its capacity, but it remains seriously under-capitalised
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and over-staffed, and its management is poorly placed to cope with a dynamic, competitive
environment.
9. Continuing regulatory and administrative challenges in Nepal
The initial stage of the liberalisation policy appears to have had a reasonable degree of success.
New entrants have emerged and do not seem to have encountered major barriers to entry.
Despite previously weak private sector participation in activities as complex as aviation, the
new entrants have developed management and operating teams and have been able to acquire
aircraft. An important outcome has been the substantial increase in capacity, and passengers
have been offered a greater range of choice of flight times, service levels and equipment. Yet
there have been problems. Indeed, RNAC has been expected to support the new entrants at
least in terms of making terminal space available and through some maintenance support, and
the state of some key airports has meant that the new entrants have not been free to serve
some of the most desirable routes.
Another problematic area with the current regulatory framework is the need to resolve what
should be the role of RNAC. RNAC's domestic fleet is much larger than those of its new rivals
and it draws 85 percent of its revenue from its international traffic. It possesses considerable
market power as a result of this, in part because it is able to feed its international traffic onto its
domestic services and also because it dominates sales by travel agents in Nepal. Should
increased competition for the tourist traffic result in losses of revenue accruing to RNAC, it
would have little option but to cross-subsidise its domestic services from its surpluses on its
international operations. Yet the new entrants have been expected to offer at least 40 percent
of their flight hours on "non-tourist" routes without the capability of cross-subsidising losses
on domestic services with the profits from other activities.
The current set of regulatory mechanisms sits on an uneasy foundation. The structure of the
incentives is such that the private sector airlines will be tempted to maximise the carriage of
foreigners at the expense of domestic residents. The current regulation on the allocation of
capacity is ambiguous and it leaves the private sector airlines with more scope to manage their
yield than RNAC (Morrison 1992). For one thing, the rate of cost recovery even on the non-
tourist routes varies widely and the private sector airlines have, not surprisingly, introduced
their services on the densest of these routes where tariffs have been at the higher end of the
range. Furthermore, the requirement to allocate capacity on non-tourist routes does not
guarantee that the new entrants will share equally in carrying low-yield traffic. The probability
is that, over time, RNAC will be left with the greatest part of the burden of subsidising
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residents' travel and, unless it can continue to subsidise its domestic operations from profits
earned elsewhere, it will have to make some form of response. Alternatively, the Government
might choose to administer the requirement on capacity allocation strictly but there is a
significant risk that this would result in an inefficiently high level of capacity. This is because
there are marked differences in the seasonal peaks in the traffic levels of the two groups and, as
pointed out above, it is difficult to regulate capacity and fares when there is a mix of low and
higher density .
A key lesson about airline regulation in developed countries is that controls on fares inevitably
lead airlines to compete amongst each other by increasing their capacity and their service
levels, especially by offering greater frequency and by providing more direct services. This
raises costs and reduces load factors and the regulator faces successive requests to increase
fares. In general, there is little incentive for airlines to operate in the most efficient way and,
over time, the airlines become less productive. The benefits of earning more from tourists' use
of air travel will be diminished if the outcome involves the purchase of aircraft capacity at
inefficiently high levels or if there is over-staffing and over-payment in the airlines. The
Government can attempt to control fares and capacity, but the further the commitment to
regulation, the greater the likelihood of increases in costs and the greater the demands on the
Government to subsidise and protect the industry.
Finally, as with many other developing countries, Nepal has demonstrated an excessive reliance
upon solutions that are capital-intensive as opposed to skills-based ones. The lack of funding
for the DCA has meant that needed improvements to passenger terminals have not occurred.
Of even greater concern is that this has prevented Nepal from fulfilling its obligations to
observe international standards of operation and safety. The ability of the DCA to implement
projects and manage change is negated by a lack of "in-house" skills and competencies. The
constant addition of internally and externally funded projects simply adds to the management
load upon the DCA resulting in further deterioration of the system as a whole. The long term
effectiveness of the sector requires a shift in emphasis towards embedding technical and
managerial skills through institutional strengthening policies and programmes for both the
DCA and RNAC. There has been recognition of this in Nepal and some steps are being taken,
with the assistance of the Asian Development Bank, to address these matters.
While the government reaction to promoting tourism has been the limited deregulation of air
transport services, there has not been a corresponding response to managing the remainder of
the system. A fragmented approach serves only to undermine and negate any government
efforts at macro reform in the vital air transport sector of the economy. It follows that if
tourism earnings in Nepal are to be maximised, then a holistic approach to system management
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is required in order to provide a seamless tourist transportation product. This approach may
include, for example, the re-organisation of the DCA or the establishment of a Civil Aviation
Authority, the upgrading of skills in rescue and fire services, air traffic control and airport
management, the implementation of a long term capital works plan, the application of
preventative maintenance programmes and the introduction of policies designed to achieve a
reasonable measure of cost recovery. The long term effects of not establishing such broadly
based policy goals and strategies, which encourage market driven efficiencies and provide for
the sustainability of air transport services, may well serve to jeopardise a major source of
income for Nepal.
10. Concluding comments - some of the lessons from the Nepal case
Aviation policy has changed markedly in Nepal as a result of general trends in government
attitudes to regulation and its government business enterprises, but also it has been a response
to concerns that the government airline was unable to cater for growth in services to tourists.
Though there have been grounds for criticism of RNAC's performance, liberalisation of airline
competition does not appear to have been the result of government dissatisfaction with its
regulatory mechanisms, nor has the government placed a high priority on reform of RNAC. At
this stage, the regulatory body retains its position as the arbiter on fare levels and fare
structures and the government airline remains intact. The Government retains control over
further entry and it has some say over which routes the private sector airlines will serve but, in
the process, RNAC's position has been weakened.
The long-standing policy of requiring the national airline to cross-subsidise travel by residents
from the profits earned from foreigners will be difficult to maintain unless the government is
able to achieve strict enforcement of its regulations, recognising that this in itself is likely to
create significant inefficiencies in the airline system over a period of time. Alternatively, it
might seek to pursue its social equity objectives in a way that does not interfere with the
measures to liberalise airline competition. Aviation is expected to play a critical role in the
continued development of the most promising sector of the Nepalese economy in terms of its
ability to earn foreign exchange, and the government will undoubtedly face critical decisions as
its polices evolve.
This is not an uncommon set of circumstances in less developed countries. In particular, some
of the contextual factors in these countries are that:
• resources are constrained
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• aviation is expected to play a key role in national development and in the pursuit of 
social equity goals, especially since surface transport into some areas is rudimentary
• the lack of a strong private sector has led government to operate airline services, usually 
committing the national airline to domestic as well as international services
• demands exist for improvements in aviation standards and capacity to promote 
international tourism as part of a strategy for economic development
• pressures mount on the government to allow the private sector to fill the void
• an inability to develop and implement effective policies and sector strategies due to 
centralised government control and the lack of skilled manpower
• a lack of institutional resources to satisfy both commercial and developmental needs
• excessive reliance upon capital-intensive solutions funded by aid donors
At best, the less developed country's airline is marginally profitable and the nation cannot
afford for it, or any new private sector airlines, to make large losses. The initiative to liberalise
the aviation market tends to be seen as a way of injecting more capital into the commercial
aviation system and as a way of increasing the scope for the private sector to participate in an
important sector of the economy, but there are significant risks involved. Basic infrastructure
and services remain weak and it is unlikely that this situation will improve simply because new
airlines have entered the market. In fact, the situation is more likely to deteriorate as facilities
become more congested and over-used.
There is a need for governments in less developed countries to recognise that liberalisation of
entry into the airline industry is merely an interim stage in a process of reform. Given a lack of
opportunity to carry out detailed analyses of the airline industry before embarking on further
steps on the path of reform, it is important that lessons be learned from the experiences with
airline regulation and competition in the developed countries. At the outset, a high priority
must be placed on strengthening the institutions responsible for the provision of airports, air
traffic control and maintenance of air safety. A problem is that airlines will seek to take
advantage of circumstances arising during the early phases of liberalisation to entrench
competitive advantage, and this can negate many of the longer term benefits of the more liberal
approach.
The lack of resources often means that the government’s airline will be neglected and pressures
mount to privatise, either fully or partially. The government stands to gain from the sale of
assets and from the diminished responsibility to fund the airline, the management tends to
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believe that privatisation is the most promising way to obtain capital funds while escaping from
direct intervention by government in its operations, and the private sector airlines argue that a
sell-off is necessary so that the government resolves a conflict of interest. However, the
experience in the developed countries indicates that privatisation requires preparation and, in
any case, the principal benefits come from competition and other stimuli aimed at promoting
efficiency.
At the same time, the government airline is likely to be in a privileged position, especially if it is
able to carry international passengers. In the end result, less developed countries will find, as
have the developed countries, that partial deregulation, continued ownership of the national
airline and insistence on maintaining unprofitable services are policies that are incompatible. In
the cases such as Nepal where entry has been permitted while the government has retained
controls over fares and over allocation of capacity, it is probable that there will be continual
pressure to relax controls even further. The experience in the developed countries is that,
where the network includes routes with low traffic densities, greater efficiency, improved
service and lower fares will result if the decisions are left to the managers of the airlines. The
objective of guaranteeing provision of services to particular areas of the nation does not
depend for its fulfilment on cross-subsidisation from profitable services. Among the
alternatives that need to be evaluated are direct payments to the airlines for performing public
service obligations, or perhaps protected route packages that induce a form of competition, the
risk of losing the right to operate.
The basic needs of capital and organisation might be introduced by the private sector, but it is
necessary to weigh up the benefits of this against the loss of control the government is almost
certainly about to experience in its aviation sector. The efficiency of the civil aviation system is
more likely to be achieved when managers of the airlines and of the aviation authorities are
placed in a position where they have clear and unambiguous objectives, a "hybrid" or
"evolutionary" approach to liberalisation is likely to result in serious inefficiencies. At all costs,
governments should avoid arrangements that require the establishment of regulatory bodies
and excessive bureaucratic control to monitor competition and to provide subsidies.
Acknowledgment
This paper is based on work two of the authors (Hooper and Hutcheson) completed in a study
carried out for His Majesty's Government of Nepal and the Asian Development Bank to
recommend ways of improving the domestic aviation industry's ability to support tourism
development in that country. We are grateful for the comments provided on an earlier draft of
this paper by Professor David Hensher, Director of the Institute of Transport Studies and by
three anonymous referees.
Hooper, Hutcheson & Nyathi The Case of Nepal
Institute of Transport Studies 22
References
Ashworth M & Forsyth P (1985) Civil Aviation Policy and the Privatisation of British
Airways. London: Institute of Fiscal Studies.
Bailey M (1993) Asia’s new airlines. EIU Travel and Tourism Analyst, Number 3: 4-18.
Barrett SD (1992) Barriers to contestability in the deregulated European aviation market.
Transportation Research 26A (2): 159-165.
Button K (1989) The deregulation of U.S. interstate aviation: an assessment of causes and
consequences (Part 2). Transport Reviews 9 (2,3).
Forsyth PJ (1991) The economics of thin air service markets. In: Mawuli A & Temu I (eds)
Strategic Options for Transport Development in Papua New Guinea. Proceedings of the
International Seminar on Strategic Options for Transport Development held on 23-28
September, 1992. Port Moresby: Department of Transport.
Hensher DA & Beesley ME (1992) Privatisation of public transit: lessons from the wider
experience. Institute of Transport Studies Working Paper ITS-WP-92-1. Sydney: The
Institute of Transport Studies, Graduate School of Business, The University of Sydney.
Intercontinental Consultants and Technocrats Pvt. Ltd. (1993) Nepal Domestic Civil Aviation
Study. Report prepared for Asian Development Bank (ADB), Manila.
Kahn A (1990) Deregulation: looking backward and looking forward. Yale Jou nal on
Regulation 7 (2): 325-354.
Lee Y-H (1992) The two airline policy in Korea - the early experience. Paper presented at the
6th World Conference on Transport Research, Lyon, June 29 - July 3.
Levine ME (1987) Airline competition in deregulated markets: theory, firm strategy, and
public policy. Yale Journal on Regulation 4 (393): 394-494.
Louden D (1993) Fledglings enter India’s open skies. Busines  Review Weekly, June 4, 1993.
Mama H (1993) Salvation for private airlines? Air Corporations Act likely to be repealed.
Interavia Aerospace World, October 1993.
Hooper, Hutcheson & Nyathi The Case of Nepal
Institute of Transport Studies 23
Mason R (1994) The price of safety in regional aviation. In Nyathi M (ed) Transport Policy
Perspectives 1994. Sydney: The Institute of Transport Studies, Graduate School of
Business, The University of Sydney (forthcoming).
Mhatre, K (1994) Private carriers unbridled. Air Transport World, March: 99-102.
Morrison SA (1992) Airline Competition Policy in Nepal. Report produced on behalf of
USAID. Boston, Massachusetts: Department of Economics, Northeastern University.
Morrison S & Winston C (1986) The Economic Effects of Airline Deregulation W shi gton
DC: Brookings Institute.
National Planning Commission (1992) Eighth Plan (1992-1997). Kathmandu: His Majesty's
Government of Nepal.
Nyathi MZ (1992) Developments in international civil aviation: what are southern Africa's
strategic options. Papers of the Australasian Transport Research Forum, 17 (2): 495-512.
Nyathi M, Hooper P & Hensher D (1993) Compass Airlines: 1 December 1990 to 20
December 1991. What went wrong?. Transport Reviews, 13 (2 & 3).
Ritchie PC & Rowcroft JE (1992) The servicing of thin markets in a deregulated aircraft
industry. Proceedings of the 6th World Conference on Transportation, Ly ns: 1-15.
Royal Nepal Airlines Corporation (1992) Operating Plan 1992/93. Kathmandu: Royal Nepal
Airlines Corporation.
Ruppenthal KM (1987) U.S. airline deregulation - winners and losers. Logistics and
Transportation Review, 23 (1), 65-82.
TecnEcon, Scott Wilson Kirkpatrick & Partners and EAST Consult (1988) Nepal Transport
Sector Profile Study. Domestic Airports. Manila: Asian Development Bank.
Touche Ross (1990) Nepal Tourism Development Plan. Report prepared by Touche Ross
Management Consultants in association with Environmental Resources Limited, The
University of Surrey and Metcon Consultants & New Era. Manila: Asian Development
Bank.
